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Abstract — The purpose of this paper is to defend 
Langsam’s Theory of Appearing (TA) against Djukic et al’s 
critique.  In strengthening Langsam’s defense of TA, I adopt 
some of Le Morvan's arguments in defending Direct Realism.  
TA states that experiences are relations between material object 
and mind, and that phenomenal features are appearances of 
relations held between material objects and mind. Djukic 
objects to TA on three grounds of Hallucination, Causal 
Principle (CP), and Time-Gap:  First, Djukic objects to TA on 
the ground that perception and hallucinations are 
phenomenally indistinguishable, thus phenomenal features (or 
properties) instantiated in perception may not be relations 
either, and thus TA could fail.  In defending TA, Langsam 
argues that indistinguishability does not entail that perception 
and hallucination instantiate the same appearance. Moreover, 
disjunctivist conception of experience supports TA in that 
phenomenal features are either a relation between a material 
object and mind, or it is something else (as in cases of 
hallucination). I aim to show that sense-data (or like) theories of 
perception, that Djukic favors as being superior, would fail 
Djukic's own scrutiny in cases of hallucination in addition to 
being against common-sense.  Second objection is that 
perception and hallucination must have the same-cause because 
they are indistinguishable, and also CP requires that same-
causes to produce the same-effects.  But hallucination and 
perception are different experiences, and hence TA fails CP.  
Responding to CP objection, “same-cause same-effect” only 
applies to intrinsic changes and intrinsic changes are changes in 
intrinsic properties and relations between intrinsic properties.  
Third, TA is opposed because for a given Time-Gap we cannot 
experience objects as they are (were) at the time of our 
perception. TA defeats this objection because it does not claim 
that “we can now (experience) the no-longer existent object as it 
is now, but only that we can now (experience) the once-existent 
object as it used to be.  Fourth, to further strengthen TA, I will 
raise objections to TA including from the vantage point of 
Durability, Perceptual Relativity, Illusion, and Partial 
Perception arguments, and respond to such objections 
accordingly. To explicate TA, I argue from the vantage points 
of common sense, realistic physical biological considerations, 
and non-miraculous expectations from any theory of 
perception, including from TA.   
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Langsam defends Theory of Appearing (TA) which states 
that the way objects appear to us are instantiations of their 
phenomenal features, and as such phenomenal features are 
relations between material objects and the mind (e.g., Object 
X appears such and such to mind Y) [1].  For example 
according to TA, an object appearing red to a subject is the 
“apple’s standing in an appearing-red to relation to a 
mind”1.  To contrast TA from more mind-centric theories of 
perception, Langsam emphasized that thoughts have no 
phenomenal character but experiences do (i.e. what it is like 
to have experiences versus thoughts). 
First objection to TA from the hallucination argument is 
that because perception and hallucination have the same 
appearance to us, they present the same phenomenal 
features, which may yield phenomenal features in perception 
and hallucination as having the same properties. For 
example, when a person hallucinates red and when he sees 
red, they are phenomenologically identical and thus 
indistinguishable in that in both cases he has something 
looking red to him2.  Langsam argues that while perception 
and hallucination may be experienced as indistinguishable, 
that does not mean for them to have the same ontological 
character.  Perception is a relation between object and mind, 
whereas hallucination is not.  Here, Langsam offers a 
disjunctivist conception of experience of perception by 
positing that there is nothing in common between seeing and 
hallucination, and he leaves open whether hallucination 
experiences are any relations of any type3. Langsam argues 
that it just would be false to concurrently claim that (a) there 
is something in common between seeing and hallucination 
and (b) also say that object of seeing is a direct object of 
awareness4.  Djukic objects to Langsam by arguing, in part, 
that unless something looking red in perception and looking 
red in hallucination were both relations, how can one explain 
their Indistinguishability?5  As such, Djukic asserts that if 
hallucination is relational, then an appropriate relatum for 
the hallucinatory experience must be specified [2].  Whether 
this relation is explained via “region of space”, “mental 
space”, or other conceptions, Djukic states that such 
“relatums are no different than sense-data countenanced by 
act-object theorist”6.  Hence, he argues that for example 
“hallucinatory experience of red apple, cannot be construed 
as a relation of being-appeared-red-to, but rather as a 
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relation of being immediately aware of some red-object.   
‘Red’ no longer goes towards specifying the appearing 
relation but (it) names the quality of an object to which we 
are related”7.  Then, Djukic makes the move that TA must be 
committed to an ontological nature of hallucinatory 
experience (that is identical to that of sense-data act-object 
theorist).  Let us step back and subject sense-data, which 
Djukic favors, to the same level of scrutiny and inquiry as 
TA:  Why and how phenomenology is such a reliable guide 
to ontology?  Can hallucination of an object be 
phenomenally indistinguishable from a real object? 
According to Djukic, the answer is yes. Hence, if objects in 
sense-datum appear phenomenally indistinguishable from 
the real objects, then this by itself is no compelling reason to 
suppose the objects of awareness in hallucination and in 
veridical perception are ontologically the same category, 
even if we suppose that sense-data (or similar ideas) are 
objects of awareness in hallucination.  Sense data theory 
which Djukic advocates to be superior to TA seems to fail 
his own scrutiny.  Second objection to TA from casual 
arguments states that same-causes should produce same-
effects, but perception and hallucination are 
indistinguishable as having the same immediate cause.  
Hence, it is argued that perception and hallucination must be 
the same experience, which they are not, and thus TA can be 
false.  Langsam holds that principle of same-cause and same-
effect only applies to intrinsic changes in an “intrinsic 
property of an object or change in the relation between 
objects whose properties have changed”8.  Djukic seems only 
partially satisfied with Langsam response to objections from 
CP, and states that “a necessary condition for the non-
violation of the same-cause same-effect principle is that the 
same kind of immediate cause not produce different kinds of 
intrinsic immediate effects”9 , but he warns that it may not to 
be sufficient10. Third objections to TA from the Time-Gap 
perspective are as follow:  Because of time-lags (or time-
gaps), we cannot experience objects as they are at the time of 
our perception.  Langsam states that things may have 
different properties at different times, and may appear 
differently at different times.  Hence, a “visual perceptual 
experience may be also as a relation that obtains between an 
object as it is at a particular time”11.  Because TA does not 
commit itself to existence of back-ward causation, TA stands 
against the idea that “if a relation obtains at some particular 
time, then the relation must obtain between objects as they 
are at that particular time”12.  Djukic objects to Langsam’s 
presuppositions that experiences are relational and external, 
that experiences do not supervene on intrinsic features of the 
mind, and Djukic is not satisfied with Langsam’s comparing 
being-appeared-to with being thought-of13.  In the fourth 
section of my discussions, I adopt Le Marvon's arguments to 
strengthen TA by raising objections to TA and responding to 
such objections from the perspectives of Partial Perception, 
Perceptual Relativity, Illusion, and Durability arguments.  
Lastly, I suggest that Djukic critique here seems against 
common sense, and his rejection of TA appear to stem from 
his commitment to space of reason than to a sound theory of 
perception [4].  It seems that Djukic's rejection of TA and 
favoring sense-data may mainly be motivated by the ease 
with which he can force-fit sense-data (or a similar) theory 
of perception, and not TA, into his more important 
commitment which is the space of reason conception14,15.  
II. DISCUSSIONS 
 Langsam's Theory of Appearing (TA) is an account of 
the ontological nature of experience.  In TA, experience is a 
relation between material objects and the mind.  Experiences 
have a phenomenal character, as in what it is like to have 
such experiences, whereas thoughts do not.  Phenomenal 
features are specific aspects of the phenomenal character 
when we have a perceptual experience, which is the way 
objects appear to us as instantiations of the phenomenal 
features of the object of our experience. Therefore, 
phenomenal features (of the object of our perceptual 
experience) are relations between such objects and our mind.  
Simply speaking, TA is how (object) X appears such and 
such to (mind) Y. In this section, I will address Djukic's 
objections to TA on grounds of Hallucination, Causality, and 
Time-Gap.  Moreover, in order to strengthen TA, I adopt La 
Marvon's arguments (in defense of Realism), by responding 
to other possible objections to TA including from Durability, 
Perceptual Relativity, Illusion, and Partial Perception 
arguments.   
A.  Argument Against TA from Hallucination Perspective: 
It is argued that when a person hallucinates, he cannot 
distinguish it from having a perceptual experience.  
Perception and hallucination are indistinguishable, because 
they experientially appear to a person as the same.  Hence, it 
is argued that because perception and hallucination present 
the same appearance, they present the same phenomenal 
features.  Hallucination’s and perception’s phenomenal 
features have the same properties, and experience of 
hallucination and perception are phenomenologically 
identical.   Moreover, in hallucination, phenomenal features 
are instantiated even when there is no perception of a real 
material object.  Perceptual experience cannot be instances 
of a sui generis relation between mind and external objects16.  
In hallucinatory cases, there exists no relation between an 
object and mind.  One can experience something like or 
about an object of a kind without veridical existence of an 
object of such kind.  Therefore, hallucination is a case when 
phenomenal features (that appear in hallucination) are not 
relations (between mind and object).  There are no 
significant qualitative or phenomenal differences between 
the objects of one's experience in cases of hallucination and 
actual perception.  Hence, it can be argued that TA fails 
given such indistinguishability between the objects of one's 
experience when he is hallucinating compared to when he 
perceives an actual object17. 
B.  Responding To Hallucination Critique Against TA: 
Objects can appear as the same to a person, when 
objects are similar and not necessarily always when objects 
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are (exactly) the same.  Also, although a perception and a 
hallucination can instantiate similar phenomenal features (in 
one's mind), the fact that perception and hallucination may 
be indistinguishable to a person, that does not necessarily 
mean that such perception and hallucination have (exactly) 
the same phenomenal features.  Langsam defends TA against 
hallucination by denying that perceptual experience and 
hallucinatory experience as having the same ontological 
character, and via invoking the disjunctivist theory (DT)18.  
By applying the DT of experience to TA, Langsam argues 
that the phenomenal feature is either a relation between X 
and Y, or something else (Z) and Y.  This move enables 
Langsam to “leave open whether hallucinatory experience 
are relations of the same kind, different in kind from the 
perception, or not relations at all”19.  Since for Langsam 
perception is matter of a mind’s standing in certain relation 
to a material object, whereas hallucination is not, then the 
“absence of a material object would not necessarily count 
against TA, whether hallucinatory experience is relational or 
not”20. Therefore, Langsam argues that phenomenal features 
of perception (of X), but not hallucination, are relations 
between material object (X) and mind (Y).  Djukic rejects 
Langsam’s response against hallucination, pointing to 
alternatives including ‘sense data’ (i.e., there can be an 
object that is red in both the perceptual and hallucinatory 
case and that there are instances of the same type of sense 
datum in each case) and ‘state’ theories (i.e., subject’s being 
in the same type of intrinsic state in each case of perceptual 
and hallucinatory experience)21 .  Djukic objects to Langsam 
by arguing, in part, that “unless something looking red in 
perception and looking red in hallucination were both 
relations, how can one explain their Indistinguishability?”22.  
If hallucination is relational, then an appropriate “relatum for 
the hallucinatory experience must be specified”23.  Whether 
this relations are explained via “region of space”, “mental 
space”, or other conceptions, Djukic suggests that such 
“relatums are no different than sense-data countenanced by 
act-object theorist”24.  Hence he argues that for example 
“hallucinatory experience of a red apple, cannot be construed 
as a relation of being-appeared-red-to, but rather as a relation 
of being immediately aware of some red-object.  ‘Red’ no 
longer goes towards specifying the appearing relation but 
names the quality of an object to which a person is related”25 
.  Then Djukic makes the move that TA must be committed 
to an ontological nature of hallucinatory experience (that is 
identical to that of act-object theorist). 
Adopting Le Morvan line of argumentation, I argue that 
if sense-datum is the object of a person's immediate 
awareness in cases of hallucination, we “need not accept that 
he is also the object of our immediate awareness about 
veridical perception”26 [3].  In Objecting to TA, Djukic 
suggested that if OH (object of hallucination) and OVP (object 
of veridical perception) are phenomenally indistinguishable, 
then OH and OVP are ontologically indistinguishable.  But, 
why phenomenology is such a reliable guide to ontology? 
Could not a hologram or hallucination of a red apple appear 
phenomenally indistinguishable from a real red apple? Yes, 
they can.  If the red apple (like) sense-datum appear 
phenomenally indistinguishable from a veridical red apple, 
then this by itself is no compelling reason to suppose that the 
objects of awareness in hallucination and in veridical 
perception are ontologically the same category, even if we 
suppose that sense-date (or alike ideas) are object of 
awareness in hallucination27.  Again, echoing Le Morvan's 
line of argumentation applied to sense-data in cases of 
hallucination, let’s suppose that a person is immediately 
aware of a red apple, but that there is no red apple out there 
to appear to him.  By making a move from ‘no physical red 
apple to appear to him’ to ‘he is immediately aware of 
something like a red apple’, one cannot conclude that sense-
data are objects of immediate awareness in cases of 
hallucination28 .  It is also of note that TA does not to need to 
conjure up some strange existence like sense-data to justify 
perception.  For more details, readers can refer to references 
and end-notes outline 4 ways that TA can survive the 
critiques from hallucination including (1) relying on the 
disjunctive theory29, “(2) state of brain, (3) mental images, 
and (4) “physical space occupants” to be object of 
experience in hallucination30.   
C.  Argument Against TA from Causality Principles (CP): 
Objection to TA from casual arguments states that same 
causes should produce same effects, but perception and 
hallucination are indistinguishable as having the same 
immediate cause.  For example, to say that the apple appears 
red to a person could be to say that the apple casually 
produces an experiential state in that person when 
phenomenal feature of redness is instantiated31 .  It is 
possible that one can have perceptual experience (of 
appearance of red apple) and its’ corresponding 
hallucination, which may be indistinguishable to him.  It is 
argued that because “perception and hallucination might 
have the same immediate cause”, perception and 
hallucination must be the same experience, which they are 
not, and hence TA can violate CP32 . 
D.  Responding To CP Critique Against TA: 
Responding to the objection from CP, Langsam argues 
that principle of same-cause and same-effect only applies to 
intrinsic changes, which are changes in “intrinsic property of 
an object, or changes in the relation between objects whose 
properties have changed”33.  Djukic, seems only somewhat 
satisfied with Langsam's response to CP's objection, and 
states that “a necessary condition for the non-violation of the 
same-cause same-effect principle is that the same kind of 
immediate cause not produce different kinds of intrinsic 
immediate effects”34 ,but he warns that it may not to be 
sufficient35.  I suggest that common sense and real-life 
considerations may favor Langsam’s view here.  We are 
beings whose perceptions in the real world depend on 
complex series of events including condition of our eyes, 
optical nerves, and other physiological causal chains in our 
brain. No one, including the proponents of TA, is “ignorant 
of the fact that there are casual intermediaries between 
objects and a person”36 .  A cause-and-effect stimulated via 
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an object (factor) is not the same as cause-and-effect 
stimulated via a cognitive-neurological factor.  Langsam 
argues that “same-cause same-effect principles apply only to 
intrinsic changes” that are associated with the “properties of 
objects  and that are in relations between intrinsic 
properties”, and that TA “need not be committed to 
possibility of the same-cause of the same-kind producing 
different-effects.…Only intrinsic changes that result from 
the operations of identical causes must be the same”37. 
E.  Argument Against TA from Time Gap argument: 
Because of time-gaps, a person cannot experience 
objects as they are at the time of his perception.  Things may 
have different properties at different times, and thus they 
may appear differently at different times.  Hence, a “visual 
perceptual experience could be supposed also as a relation 
that obtains between an object as it is at a particular time”38 .  
However minute, any time lag between an object and one's 
perceptual experience (i.e., I can still see a star one light year 
away, which died a year ago) of such object may be 
incompatible with TA because for a given time-gap (or time-
lag) one cannot experience the object as it is at the time of 
our perception . 
F.  Response to The Time Gap Objection: 
Langsam posits that because TA does not commit itself 
to existence of back-ward causation, TA rejects the 
suggestion that “if a relation obtains at some particular time, 
then the relation must obtain between objects as they are at 
that particular time”39.  Djukic objects to Langsam’s 
presupposition that experiences are relational and external, 
that experiences do not supervene on intrinsic features of the 
mind, and Djukic is not satisfied with Langsam’s comparing 
being-appeared-to with being thought-of40 .  Djukic is not 
satisfied with just taking Langsam’s “word that experiences 
are relational, and external, and external relations are 
datable”. However, other than negating Langsam’s words, he 
does not offer a substantial counter-argument41.  Again, I 
suggest that common sense may favors Langsam’s position.  
TA does “not deny the existence of time lags in perception, 
and does not need to be committed to endowing human 
percipients with miraculous perceptual abilities inconsistent 
with our best physical theories”42 .  Because a person deals 
with near-by objects in “majority of his day-to-day activities, 
his perceptual experiences appear so quickly that they seem 
to occur instantaneously”43 .  It therefore may be odd to think 
about currently experiencing, for example, seeing a star that 
died a year ago.  But once a person realizes that all 
perceptions, involve some time lag, in the context of larger 
spatial-temporal distances, then it is not as odd to accept the 
idea of seeing an object that no longer exists.  TA need not 
commit itself to the idea that “a person can now (experience 
the appearance of) the no-longer existent object as it is now, 
but only that one can now (experience the appearance of) the 
once-existent object as it used to be”44. This view resonates 
with common sense.  
 In the last segment of my discussions, I adopt Le 
Marvon's insights to strengthen TA by very briefly raising 
objections and responding to such objection from the 
perspective of Partial Perception, Perceptual Relativity, 
Illusion, and Durability arguments: 
G.  Partial Perception Argument: 
There is no more reason to think that perceiving a 
physical object entails perceiving all of its part at once (e.g., 
in thinking that visiting Paris entails seeing all of its parts at 
once, or eating a watermelon entails being able to eat it with 
one bite).  Similarly, in seeing a physical object (according 
to TA) “there is surely some parts of it, which I do not and 
cannot see”  due to nature of things45. 
H.  Perceptual Relativity and Illusion Argument: 
An object can appear (qualitative or quantitative) as 
certain color, size, height, and shape from one angle and 
appear differently from another view point.  For example, 
when a circle appears elliptical to a person, he is 
immediately (experiencing or) aware of an oval and not a 
circle.  Similarly, a straight stick that is half submerged in 
water would appear bent to him – he is immediately aware of 
something bent and not straight.  The stick looks bent 
because of photons interacting differently in different 
mediums (i.e. air versus water).  A circle appears elliptical 
when viewed from different angles due to the raw perceptual 
relativity that is operant between a person and his universe.  
There is no need to “reify appearances as objects of 
immediate awareness in order to account for the facts of 
perceptual relativity or intervening mediums.  TA can 
account for perceptual relativity or intervening mediums by 
“appealing to various physical and physiological 
considerations”46 .  For perceptual theories to be sound, they 
neither need to be tested against nor commit a person, for 
example, to super-human capacities that are beyond his 
physical realities or physiological capabilities, and as such 
we neither need to produce strange theories such as sense-
date (or alike) nor “deny our perceptual relativity 
inconsistent with our best physical theories” 47.  
I.  Durability Argument: 
It can be argued that TA is false because what a person 
experiences as appearance (i.e. color) of objects (that is 
present to one’s consciousness) is some sensible existence 
that is not identical to any (i.e. color of) physical object48 .  
For example, a person can doubt if anything is actually 
colored because color of varying objects are just reflection 
from surfaces consisting of photons vibrating differently 
depending on the structural composition of the object’s 
surfaces.  But this kind of objection is due to doubt (in the 
intentional context) and not perception itself, be it in TA or 
sense-data or other perception theories49 . 
Much of Djukic’s critique of Langsam’s defense of TA 
is focused on the argument from hallucination.  But it is of 
note that the real life experiences of hallucination for 
ordinary people in sober conditions do not fit the profile of 
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the kind of hallucination that Djukic is using to reject TA.  It 
is self-evident that a very small percentage of population 
experience hallucination while sober and awake, whereas all 
people experience perception (but for blind people).  It is 
likely that those people who hallucinate, do so a small 
portion of their waking and sober lives.  Also, a very small 
percentage of those people who hallucinate, remember 
details about their hallucinations to tell about it.  Based on 
my very limited understanding (and some TV 
documentaries), of those very few who can remember to 
describe their hallucination, they claim that the totality (of 
the entire narrative) of experience in hallucination is very 
different from a typical perceptual experience narrative, 
despite short clips of hallucination that may contain one or a 
few episodes (i.e., of seeing a red apple) that may resemble a 
perceptual experience. Again based on limited testimonies 
that I have heard or seen, even such isolated clip of the 
hallucinatory narratives generally do not carry the same kind 
of vivid, or rich, continuous, or tangible character as 
compared with a perceptual experience. Moreover, they are 
generally devoid of the kind of other sensations that 
accompany perceptual experiences such as smell or sound or 
touch that a person would expect and generally feels 
concurrent with perceptual experience.  
III. CONCLUSION 
My goal in this paper is to defend Langsam’s Theory of 
Appearing (TA) against Djukic et al’s rejection of TA.  In 
strengthening Langsam’s defense of TA, I adopt insights that 
Le Morvan had raised in defending Direct Realism.  TA 
claims that experiences are relations between material object 
and mind, and that phenomenal features are relations that 
hold between material objects and minds. Djukic objects to 
TA on grounds of Hallucination, Causal Principle (CP), and 
Time-Gap.   Objecting to TA, is firstly because perception 
and hallucinations are phenomenally indistinguishable, thus 
TA could fails.  Defending TA, in part via disjunctivist 
conception of experience supports TA in that phenomenal 
features are either a relation between a material object and a 
mind, or it is something else (as in cases of hallucination).  
Second objection to TA is that perception and hallucination 
must have the same cause because they are indistinguishable, 
and the CP requires for same-causes to produce the same-
effects, and hence TA could fail CP.  Responding to CP's 
objection, “same-cause same-effect” only applies to intrinsic 
changes.  Thirdly, TA is opposed because for a given Time-
Gap it is argued that a person cannot experience objects as 
they are (were) at the time of his perception.  TA defeats this 
objection because TA does not claim that “a person can now 
(experience) the no-longer existent object as it is now, but 
only that he can now (experience) the once-existent object as 
it used to be”.  To further strengthen TA, I raise additional 
objections to TA including from Durability, Perceptual 
Relativity, Illusion, and Partial Perception arguments and 
respond to them accordingly.  In support of TA, I advocate 
for common sense, realistic physical biological 
considerations, and non-miraculous expectations from any 
theory of perception, including from TA.  I wonder whether 
Djukic might have been so concerned and committed to 
Space of reason that his enquiry into theory of perception 
was primarily to force-fit (all of) perception into Space of 
reason (going all the way out).  If Djukic is not motivated to 
cash out a sound perception theory, that can at least partially 
explain why he does not scrutinize sense-data (or alike), why 
he is motivated to advocate for obsolete perception 
conceptions such as sense data (or alike), and how he might 
view TA as a threat to his commitment to space of reason. 
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